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Practice-Use of a Perdiem Formula for Pain and Suffering in
Argument to the Jury-Plaintiff, a fifty year old woman, in attempt-
ing to board defendant's bus, caught her arm in the closing bus
door. At the trial of the action testimony was offered to show that
plaintiff had incurred $348 for medical treatment and had missed
62 days of work. A physician testified that in addition plaintiff
had a permanent injury to her arm and any use thereof would cause
her pain for the duration of her life. Actuarial tables were intro-
duced to show that plaintiff had a life expectancy of 20 years.
In the closing argument to the jury, plaintiff's counsel was per-
mitted, over defendant's objection, to use a blackboard to display
and suggest to the jury a mathematical formula for the computa-
tion of damages for future pain and suffering. Counsel calculated
this at $1.50 per day for the remainder of plaintiff's life. The jury
determined that there was liability and returned a verdict of $13,500.
Held: It was error for the court to permit the suggestion of a per-
diem basis for determination of a lump sum figure to compensate
plaintiff for future pain and suffering. Such argument had no basis
in the evidence. The question of damages for pain and suffering
belongs strictly to the jury, although counsel may suggest a lump
sum amount which they believe the evidence will fairly and rea-
sonably support. Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 11
Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W. 2d 274 (1960).
Historically, Wisconsin has held that closing arguments are to
be confined to the facts in evidence or what may properly be in-
ferred from the evidence;' that inflammatory remarks of counsel
which tend to influence the jury's thinking are prejudicial ;2 and
that any mathematical approach to the subject of damages for pain
and suffering is objectionable. 3 But the question of use of a mathe-
matical formula to calculate future pain and suffering had never
before presented itself in Wisconsin.
From an analysis of this area of the law it appears that the dis-
tinction between oral and graphic means of employing the device of
a formula is largely superficial. It is the suggestion of a formula to
' Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878).2Taylor v. Chicago & Northwestern Rwy., 103 Wis. 27, 79 N.W. 17 (1899)
wherein counsel argued: "... . no amount of money could place her back where
she was before receiving the injuries complained of .... that if this courtroom
was filled with gold, that could not and would not pay it. .. "3 Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940), but cf., Otto v.
Milwaukee Northern Rwy. Co., 148 Wis. 54, 134 N.W. 157 (1912); Wasicek
v. M. Carpenter Baking Co., 179 Wis. 274, 191 N.W. 503 (1923) ; and Blaisdell
v. Allstate Insurance Co., 1 Wis. 2d 19, 82 N.W. 2d 886 (1957), in all of
which the Supreme Court indulged in mathematical computations to calculateproper jury awards for past pain and suffering.
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which objection is generally made although visualizing the formula
may tend to make a slightly stronger impression on the juror.
The first known instance of a blackboard or chart being used
to display items of damages was in 1950, 4 the same year in which
an oral per-diem suggestion for evaluating future pain and suffering
was first approved.5 The first case combining these elements was
4-County Electric Power Association v. Clardy,6 where counsel dis-
played a 5' by 4' chart which listed plaintiff's age, life expectancy,
loss of future earnings and future pain and suffering calculated at
$5 per day for the rest of his life. The jury awarded $75,000 to
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Mississippi said the use of the
chart in opening and closing arguments was proper:
All of the figures on the chart, except those with reference
to pain, suffering and mental anguish, were supported by
some evidence in the record .... [Plaintiff's Counsel] would
have a right to state orally and in detail what damages he
expected to prove and he would have the right to take a pen-
cil, list those items of damages, and show that sheet of paper
to the jury in the opening statements and arguments.7
Two justices dissented on this issue, stating that the determination
of damages for pain and suffering was a matter exclusively within
the province of the jury.
Since 1954, several states have adopted the attitude of the Miss-
issippi Court and allowed the visual display of a per-diem formula
in the closing arguments, with various limitations being placed on
this rule. In Ratner v. Arrington," the Florida Supreme Court noted
that there was a split of authority on the question and cautiously
decided to leave the propriety of this type of argument to the discre-
tion of the trial judge. Other courts have permitted the display of
a per-diem formula to determine pain and suffering for illustrative
purposes only;9 in another court it was dependent on the circum-
4 Kimbell v. Noel, 228 S.W. 2d 980 (Tex. 1950). The court noted that the display
had little if any effect on the jury since they awarded less than one-half the
amount urged by counsel on the blackboard, a highly dubious conclusion at
best.
5T. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W. 2d 786 (Tex. 1950). In
one isolated earlier case, Bullock v. Chester & Darby Telford Road Co., 270
Pa. 295, 113 Atl. 379 (1921), counsel attempted to use a per-diem basis for loss
of future earnings but apparently did too fine a job of advocacy and found
his argument condemned when the jury came in with an award identical to
the amount he had suggested.
6221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954).
7Id. at 151.
8 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959).
9 Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W. 2d 30 (1956).
This appears to be too fine a line of distinction to be workable.
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stances of the case.10 In another instance, a display was admissible
when the award on its face was not excessive."1
All courts do seem to agree on at least two points: that no ex-
pert testimony can be offered on the question of what will consti-
tute reasonable compensation for future pain and suffering; 12 and
that the calculations, diagrams, and words placed on a blackboard
are not to be given the weight of evidence by the jury. 3 Most
courts require an instruction by the trial judge to this effect, al-
though it is highly dubious that such an instruction has its desired
effect on the jury.
In 1958, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down the now
famous "Botta rule,"' 4 which has been cited ever since as the lead-
ing authority opposed to use of formulae for calculating pain and
suffering. The Botta case differs from the Affet case in that no black-
board or other graphic device was used and a formula was only sug-
gested for past pain and suffering. Still, it represents the most exhaustive
resume of cases in the general area.
Since the Botta decision, several courts have dealt with the
problem, as indeed, it has become common procedure for counsel
whose client has a permanent discomfort, to employ a formula in
his argument wherever the trial judge will permit it. So far as can
be ascertained, five states, including Wisconsin, have since adopted
generally the views expressed in Botta,-5 and five states have held
contra to that decision.1 6 A few states which had earlier permitted
the use of a per-diem formula have reaffirmed their positions since
the Botta case.'7
Proponents of both points of view have advanced many reasons
for espousing their cause. Those in favor of use of a formula argue
10 Jones v. Hogan, - Wash -. 351 P. 2d 153 (1960). The court here said, "We
neither approve nor disapprove of the argument [for or against formulae] in
general. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances." 351 P. 2d at 159.
11 Braddock v. Seaboard Airline Rwy. Co., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955). This "end
justifies the means" attitude seems to be the converse of the Wisconsin posi-
tion as set forth in the Affett case, i.e., that the per-diem argument is per Se
improper, because it has no basis in the evidence, regardless of the size of the
verdict.
12 McCoRMicK, EvIDENcE, 26 (1954).
13 88 CJ.S. Trial §375 (1955).
14 After Botta v. Brunner, 26 NJ. 82, 138 A. 2d 713 (1958).
15 In addition to the Affett case, see: Certified T.V. and Appliance Co. v. Har-
rington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E. 2d 126 (1959); Cooley v. Crispino, 21 Conn.
Sup. 150, 147 A. 2d 497 (1958); Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A. 2d 394(1958) ; Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W. 2d 588 (Mo. 1959).16 Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P. 2d 575 (1960);
Jones v. Hogan - Wash -, 351 P. 2d 153 (1960) ; Johnson v. Brown, - Nev.
-, 345 P. 2d 754 (1959); McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315(1958); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W. 2d 155
(Ky. 1960).
17 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959), Continental Bus System v.
Toombs, 325 S.W. 2d 153 (Texas, 1959).
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that "the primary purpose of argument by counsel is to enlighten
the jury."' s Although admitting that the argument is not evidence
in itself, they state that a juror is unable to ascertain properly for
himself what such a nebulous item as future pain and suffering is
worth and that he needs some guideposts (i.e., formulae) to assist
him in arriving at a fair award. They insist that in so suggesting
a formula they are merely drawing reasonable inferences from the
testimony.19
Other arguments advanced by plaintiffs' attorneys are that the
trial judge can, in his instructions to the jury, dispell any exagger-
ated ideas they may have acquired by pointing out to them that
the suggested formula is not in the evidence, and that defendant's
counsel is also free to use a formula to calculate his suggested allow-
ance for pain and suffering.20 Also it has been argued that the trial
judge may still offer a remittitur or new trial if he considers the
award excessive, basing such considerations on the evidence.
Arguments against the formula are based largely on the fact
that the jury is to make its determination while considering only
the evidence and that to allow an attorney to suggest a method of
arriving at an amount to be awarded is the equivalent of the attor-
ney giving testimony. There is no evidentiary basis for converting
pain and suffering to a monetary amount since no witness, expert
or otherwise, can ever express his subjective opinion of its value. 21
Justice Hallows, in the Affett case, submits that it is for the jury
to determine damages for pain and suffering after considering the
"nature, intensity and extent as disclosed by the evidence." 2 2 The
Justice also points out that a suggestion of a formula by plaintiff's
counsel emasculates the role of the jury whose function is to arrive
at the amount of compensatory damages in light of its own knowl-
1s 88 C.J.S. Trial §169 (1955).
'9 The position is eloquently stated in the Ratner decision: "In so holding [that
the use of the formula is proper] we give due regard to the proposition that
'pain and suffering have no market price'. But the very absence of a fixed rule
or standard for any monetary admeasurement of pain and suffering as an
element of damages supplies a reason why counsel for the parties should be
allotted on this item of damages, their entitled latitude in argument-to com-
ment on the evidence, its nature and effect, and to note all proper inferences
which reasonably may spring from the evidence adduced." Ratner v. Arring-
ton, supra note 8, at 89.
2o In one situation, outlined in 6 DEFENSE L. J. 142 (1959), Counsel for defend-
ant was able to turn the tables on the plaintiff by use of mathematics. He
illustrated to the jury how the sum demanded by plaintiff, if invested conserva-
tively at 4% return, would yield plaintiff an annual income for life in excess
of his normal earnings and the principal would remain intact and go to his
heirs.
217 WIGMORE EVIDENCE §1944 (3rd ed. 1940).
2Affett v. Milvaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 609, 106
N.W. 2d 274, 277.
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edge and experience as to the nature of pain and suffering and the
value of money.
23
Perhaps there is no more lucid example of just how far a formula
can go to influence the jury to rely on it than the case of Seaboard Air-
line Railroad Co. v. Braddock.2 4 There the jury returned a verdict in
the amount of $248,439, the exact dollar amount as computed by the
plaintiff's counsel on a placard displayed to the jury during his
closing argument.2
5
As has been stated, the Wisconsin position has long been that
the court cannot suggest any dollar amount or range of figures to
the jury to be awarded plaintiff for his pain and suffering ;21 the
idea being that such suggestions are neither evidence nor proper
inferences from the evidence. It would appear from the cases that
this limitation also applied to counsel .2  The Wisconsin Court, in
the Affett decision, purports to uphold this position. Yet, a new standard
may have been established.
Counsel for both the plaintiff and the defendant may
make an argumentative suggestion in summation from the
evidence of a lump sum dollar amount for pain and suffering
which they believe the evidence will fairly and reasonably
support. Counsel may not argue such amount was arrived at
or explained by a mathematical formula or on a per-day,
per-month, or on any other time-segment basis.2 8 [Emphasis
added.]
With this statement the court clearly establishes the limits
within which counsel must contain his arguments. He may tell
the jury that he feels the evidence warrants an award of $10,000
for future discomfort to his client, but he cannot state how he
arrived at this figure.2 9 This distinction is easily made, but the rub
occurs when the reason for the rule is understood. Counsel cannot
suggest an amount to be allowed for one day or one hour of pain
23 Id. at 613, 106 N.W. 2d at 279.
2496 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1957). The lower court, however, was reversed on the
question of damages when the Florida Supreme Court noted the identicalness
of the award and amount requested and the fact that there were several over-
lapping items in the chart shown to the jury.
25 It is this probable impact on the jury which prompted the New Jersey Court
in the Botta case to say: "If the day ever arrives when that type of specula-
tion becomes accepted by the courts generally as a fair mathematical factor
for use by juries, proponents of the view that motor vehicle accident injury
claims should be treated on some basis similar to workmen's compensation,
will have grist for their mill." Botta v. Brunner, supra note 14, at 723.
26 Otto v. Milwaukee Northern Rwy. Co., 148 Wis. 54, 134 N.W. 157 (1912).
27 Larson v. Hanson, 207 Wis. 485, 242 N.W. 184 (1932).2 8 Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., supra note 22, at 614, 106
N.W. 2d at 280 (1960).
29 Presumably counsel is free to use a per-diem basis to calculate loss of future
earnings in argument, provided there has been testimony as to plaintiff's past
earnings and his diminished earning capacity, since the rule in Affett appears
to be limited to the amount for pain and suffering.
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because there is nothing in the evidence to support this figure.
Surely there is no greater basis in the evidence for supporting a
suggested amount to be allowed for pain over a longer time seg-
ment than the life expectancy of the plaintiff.
The only manner in which one can justify this anomaly is by
recognition of the simple fact that juries do appear to return higher,
often excessive, verdicts in cases where suggestion of a per-diem
formula is permitted than in those cases where no such suggestion
was employed.30 Viewed in this light, the distinction gains at least
practical validity, but the failure of the court to present its case
in that vein leaves doubt as to whether the distinction was intended
and if it will survive. In any event, it is now clear that a suggested
award, couched in non-inflammatory terms, is permissible. While
the Affett decision is technically a defeat for plaintiff's counsel in Wis-
consin, it may have given them more leeway than they legally en-
joyed in the past.
Louis W. STAUDENMAIER, JR.
Constitutional Law - Congressional Investigations - First
Amendment Limitations on the Power to Punish for Contempt for
Refusing to Answer before a Congressional Committee: The peti-
tioner was summoned to testify before a committee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities at a hearing in Atlanta,
Georgia. The subcommittee was investigating Communist colonization
and infiltration of industry in the South. After being sworn in and
stating his name, the petitioner refused to answer any further questions
on the ground that his rights under the First Amendment would thereby
be violated. As a result of his refusal to answer the subcommittee, he
was convicted for contempt of Congress and this conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and upheld the conviction. The basis of the decision
was that the First Amendment claims raised by the petitioner were
identical to those advanced in the Barenblatt' decision and upon the
authority of that case could not prevail. Wilkinson v. United States,
- U.S.- , 5 L. Edd. 2d 633 (1961).-
30 The National Association of Claimant's Compensation Attorneys recognizes
this distinction and has filed Amicus Curiae briefs in several recent cases, in-
cluding the Affett case, involving the question of use of a formula.
1 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 (1959).
2 The specific question that Wilkinson was convicted for refusing to answer
was: "Mr. Wilkinson, are you now a member of the Communist Party?"
Wilkinson v. United States, - U.S. -, 5L. Ed. 2d 633, 639 (1961). The con-
viction was assaulted from several different directions before the Supreme
Court: 1) the subcommittee was without authority to interrogate him, be-
cause their purpose was to investigate opposition to the committee and to
harass and expose him, 2) the question under inquiry by the subcommittee,
which he refused to answer, was not pertinent to the investigation, 3) the
[Vol. 45
